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State Sovereignty and the Two Faces of Federalism: A
Comparative Study of Federal Jurisdiction and the
Conflict of Laws
Lea Brilmayer*
and Ronald D. Lee**
The Burger Court continues to remind us that our federal sys-
tem is alive and well.' The states are not political anachronisms
which merely impede the progressive nationalization of the court
system and the law. State territorial boundaries reflect truly sover-
eign borders, not just convenient administrative divisions. Admit-
tedly, federal law governs more areas of conduct than before, and
federal adjudicative jurisdiction has expanded accordingly. In addi-
tion, the increased mobility of citizens and capital renders state
lines less important as a practical matter. Still, we are told, these
trends do not spell the demise of state sovereignty or the complete
centralization of legal institutions and power.
The Court's increased attention to issues of federalism and
state sovereignty has potential consequences in at least two sepa-
rate doctrinal areas: federal jurisdiction and the conflict of laws.
Most of the Court's sovereignty decisions have occurred in federal
jurisdiction, where deference to "state sovereignty" has meant lim-
iting the federal courts' perceived intrusiveness into state preroga-
tives. In conflict of laws, "state sovereignty" means restricting the
opportunities of one state to disregard legitimate concerns of the
others.2 In both contexts, restrictive jurisdictional doctrines reduce
the opportunity of one party to choose, at the expense of an alter-
native forum and its legitimate interests, the law and courts of the
most advantageous forum. The effort to restrict litigant choice is
often grounded either in the need to reduce forum shopping or
simply in terms of comity and deference to the interests of the alter-
native state.
Although concerns for comity and the prevention of forum
shopping are potentially as relevant between states as between a
* Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
** J.D., Yale Law School, 1985.
1 E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980) (despite
growth in economic interdependence of states, state lines are still relevant for jurisdictional
purposes); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) ("Our Federalism" requires that na-
tional government vindicate federal rights and interests without undue interference with a
state's legitimate activities).
2 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 286, 292 (1980).
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state and the federal government, these themes have not received
equally serious treatment in the two contexts. In the federal/state
arena, forum shopping is treated as a serious threat to relations be-
tween the superior sovereign and the inferior ones. In the Burger
Court's view, deference to state interests requires strict limits on
such activities. 3 Any differences in fora that might encourage fo-
rum shopping must be eradicated. To the extent that differences
remain, litigants are denied choice and routed strictly to one forum
or another.
In conflict of laws a more freewheeling attitude prevails.
Although the Court speaks the language of state sovereignty, 4 its
decisions permit virtually complete disregard of the interests of the
other states. Forum shopping is a natural and permissible activity
of all shrewd litigants. Variation amongst results is treated toler-
antly, and by judicious choice of forum the moving party may
choose amongst these various results. Indeed, "a plaintiff's choice
of forum should rarely be disturbed." 5 This difference in the seri-
ousness with which state sovereignty is treated raises an interesting
question. Does the Burger Court believe that a particular state
court is really more threatened by competition from a federal court
than by competition from another state? If so, why? Perhaps be-
cause of academic specialization, the different meanings of comity
in the two doctrinal areas have escaped notice and critique. Cer-
tainly the Court's opinions in these areas have not discussed the
comparison.
This article examines why state sovereignty has been defined
and viewed differently in these two facets of the federal system. We
first examine four doctrinal issues which arise in both federal juris-
diction and conflict of laws: adjudicative jurisdiction, enforcement
ofjudgments, sovereign immunity, and choice of law. The litigant's
range of choice in these four areas is narrowly circumscribed in fed-
eral/state relations, but expansively interpreted in state/state rela-
tions. Themes of comity and state sovereignty arise in both areas,
but are only taken seriously in the competition between federal and
state courts. In effect, a federal court must defer to an alternative
state forum in cases where another state need not.
We then discuss how this differential treatment might have
evolved. To a certain extent, differential treatment may be justifi-
3 See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (1980) (collateral estoppel effect given to
state court judgment on federal constitutional issue; no universal right to litigate federal
claim in federal district court); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (federalism
normally prevents federal court from enjoining pending state court proceedings).
4 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 286, 292 (1980).
5 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gil-
bert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)).
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able. At other times it results simply from shifting coalitions in
opinions. This explanation may absolve particular Justices of any
charges of inconsistency6 but is hardly fortunate for legal doctrine.
On occasion, its legitimacy seems highly doubtful. It may be, for
example, that requiring a federal court to defer to a state court in
instances when another state court need not defer is motivated by
purely political concerns. The reason may be merely a preference
for state courts over more liberal lower federal courts for the adju-
dication of civil rights cases.
While political motivations are very likely at work, we argue
that the stringent restrictions on forum shopping in the fed-
eral/state context may be viewed more accurately as a reactive ef-
fort to cope with the unanticipated problems that the myth of
federal/state court parity creates. The myth has both a procedural
and a substantive aspect: It tells us that a federal and a state court
are equally adept at the process of adjudicating issues of federal law
and that therefore they will arrive at the same substantive results.
Yet the two court systems do produce different results, and we be-
lieve that some differences may be structurally defensible. So long
as formal jurisdictional theory denies these differences, however, it
cannot address them. The end result is the worst of both worlds:
We can neither make the two systems converge nor deal with their
inevitable divergence rationally.
I. Protecting State Sovereignty in the Supreme Court: Doctrine
A. Adjudicative Jurisdiction
Interjurisdictional competition is perhaps most evident in the
context of adjudicative jurisdiction. Federal jurisdiction and con-
flict of laws problems relating to adjudicative jurisdiction have a
common structure. The moving party (usually the plaintiff, but oc-
casionally the defendant as in removal cases) 7 has selected a forum
(the "chosen forum"). The protesting party has an alternative fo-
rum in mind. The question is the extent to which the chosen forum
must invalidate the moving party's forum choice and relinquish ju-
risdiction out of deference to the preferences of the protesting
6 For example, Justice Rehnquist and ChiefJustice Burger are generally consistent in
restricting forum shopping in both the state and federal contexts. They favored limiting
jurisdiction in Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984); All-
state Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Thomas
v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); and Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). Justice White has
been only slightly less consistent. Justices Brennan and Marshall were also consistent; they
favored expanding forum power in each of these instances.
7 We also choose this terminology because the moving party may be both a plaintiff in
one case and a criminal defendant in simultaneous state court litigation.
1985]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
party and to the interests of the alternative forum in adjudicating
the case.
In the federal/state situation, the chosen forum is a federal
court and the alternative forum a state court. The would-be forum
shopper presses to make the federal courts more generally avail-
able. This jurisdictional claim occurs primarily in the civil rights
context, particularly when a criminal defendant challenges state law
as violative of federal constitutional rights. Despite the apparent
satisfaction of statutory jurisdictional criteria, however, the Court
has increasingly restricted the civil rights plaintiff's choice of a fed-
eral forum and has urged aggrieved individuals to litigate in state
court.
Because the history of this problem has been so adequately
documented elsewhere,8 we discuss the doctrine only briefly for the
limited purpose of comparing it to the conflict of laws. The
Supreme Court interpreted "Our Federalism" in Younger v. Harris.9
Younger held that a federal court may not enjoin a state criminal
prosecution on the ground of federal unconstitutionality unless the
threatened injury is irreparable, great, immediate, and cannot be
prevented by a defense against a single criminal prosecution. The
Court invoked the principle that "the National Government will
fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways." 10 Comity protects
the state against surrendering its control over its criminal laws to
the federal court's judgment about their constitutionality. In effect,
the defendant would have to raise any federal constitutional de-
fense as a defense to the state prosecution. The defendant could
not shop for a federal forum in presenting federal constitutional
defenses despite the fact that jurisdiction was concededly author-
ized by the relevant statutory provisions; 1' such a practice would
disturb state proceedings.
Since Younger, the Court has extended the ban on choice of fo-
rum in criminal proceedings brought by the state to include a vari-
ety of pending state civil proceedings. Samuels v. Mackell' 2 denied
8 See, e.g., Laycock, Federal Interference With State Prosecutions: The Need For Prospective Re-
lief, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 193, 193-97; Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1117-18 (1977); Smith, Full Faith and Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisal, 63 N.C.L. REV.
59, 63-81 (1984); Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative His-
tory of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE LJ. 987, 1020-39.
9 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
10 Id. at 46.
11 Id. at 40-41. The Court apparently assumed that the federal court had statutory ju-
risdiction, but held that the national policy against federal injunctions of pending state
court proceedings deprived the federal court of power to enjoin enforcement of the statute
at issue.
12 401 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1971).
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federal declaratory relief to the defendants in a New York prosecu-
tion under a criminal anarchy statute. The Court reasoned that a
declaratory judgment, as much as an injunction, would frustrate the
basic policy against federal interference with state prosecutions.
This reluctance to interfere has also extended to a state's appellate
proceedings, which the defendant must exhaust despite his belief
that chances of success on appeal are inauspicious. Huffman v. Pur-
sue, Ltd. 13 decided that the litigant's attempted move into federal
court was "a direct aspersion on the capabilities and good faith of
state appellate courts." 14
The trend continued inJuidice v. Vail,' 5 in which the Court re-
fused to allow a district court to enjoin state contempt proceedings
authorized by statute for disobedience of a court-sanctioned sub-
poena. The state's interest in the contempt process, like the crimi-
nal proceeding in Younger and the quasi-criminal proceeding in
Huffman, was sufficiently important to fall within the principles of
Younger. Younger has also been applied to halt a federal suit seeking
an injunction against enforcement of a state obscenity statute once
state criminal proceedings had commenced,' 6 and to bar federal in-
terference in a civil action seeking return of welfare payments.' 7
Once again, the Court was concerned about disrupting suits by the
state in its sovereign capacity and about "the negative reflection on
the state's ability to adjudicate federal claims that occurs whenever
a federal court enjoins a pending state proceeding."18 The Younger
doctrine has also been applied to a state agency's civil suit for emer-
gency protection of children against parental abuse.' 9
The "comity" theme cannot be explained in terms of avoiding
duplicative litigation.20 That explanation of judicial economy,
standing alone, should not render irrelevant those jurisdictional
statutes that clearly vest concurrent jurisdiction. 2' Moreover, com-
13 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
14 Id. at 608.
15 430 U.S. 327, 338-39 (1977).
16 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
17 Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977).
18 Id. at 446.
19 Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979).
20 The Younger line of cases did not rely on any of the federal jurisdictional statutes that
address the problem of duplicative litigation. The Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1982), for example, was held inapplicable to § 1983 actions in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225 (1972).
21 The Supreme Court carved out another nonstatutory exception to the federal courts'
exercise of concurrent jurisdiction in Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States,
424 U.S. 800 (1976), and Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Arizona, 103 S. Ct. 3201
(1983). Statutes authorized federal jurisdiction over suits by the United States and by In-
dian tribes, the plaintiffs in these cases, and federal substantive law governed the extent of
federal and Indian reserved water rights. The Court nevertheless required federal courts to
defer to state court proceedings. One dissent in San Carlos Apache castigated the Court's
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ity is not limited to situations in which a state court proceeding is
pending. Even when the state has not yet initiated either a criminal
or a civil proceeding, the prospective defendant is not entirely free
to choose a federal forum in which to raise his federal constitutional
claims.
One example of a restriction on federal court jurisdiction
where no state proceeding is pending is Fair Assessment in Real Estate
Association v. McNay,22 in which the Court denied jurisdiction over a
section 1983 action challenging the constitutionality of the adminis-
tration of a state tax system. While recognizing that section 1983
did not require exhaustion of state remedies as a prerequisite to
federal jurisdiction, the Court nevertheless held that comity barred
the suit. The principle of avoiding interference with the state's fis-
cal operations was implicated even though no injunction or declara-
tory judgment was sought. Before section 1983 damages could be
awarded, the court would have to declare that the tax system vio-
lated constitutional rights, an intrusion into the state's fiscal affairs.
Regardless of the outcome, the very pendency of the suit would
disrupt the state's revenue collection system. The Court observed
that the nonexhaustion requirement for a section 1983 action, if
applied to this case, would exacerbate the intrusiveness. Taxpayers
"would be able to invoke federal judgments without first permitting
the State to rectify any alleged impropriety." 23 Comity dictated
that the taxpayers' rightful remedy was in state court, with ultimate
review to the Supreme Court.
The emerging trend is easy enough to discern: deference to
the alternative state forum. Turning our attention to the other fed-
eralism context, however, we find a contrary development. In the
state/state context, the Supreme Court has ostensibly resurrected
state sovereignty and the interests of the alternative forum as com-
pelling considerations in several recent cases.24 It has recognized
that state sovereignty provides reasons for restricting jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, in the context of state/state personal jurisdiction, the
doctrine tolerates forum shopping to a far greater extent than in
the federal/state context. The moving party has great latitude in
deciding where to bring an action as between states A and B; either
the plaintiff or the defendant, by suitable anticipatory filings, can
preference for the state forum, asserting that the history of state-Indian antagonism and the
federal government's fiduciary role toward Indian tribes justified precisely the opposite re-
sult. Id. at 3218 (StevensJ, dissenting).
22 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
23 Id. at 113-14.
24 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 J.S. 286 (1980); see also Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 n.10 (1982)
(explaining state sovereignty in terms of personal rights of individual defendants).
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take advantage of this opportunity to choose the most favorable fo-
rum. A recent opinion, Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,25 suggests
that a certain amount of forum shopping is the inevitable and natu-
ral result of a federal system.
Keeton involved a defamation action by a New York resident
against Hustler Magazine. The statute of limitations applicable to
the plaintiff's claim had run in every state except New Hampshire,
and the only connection between the litigation and New Hampshire
was one that New Hampshire shared with every other state in the
country-some of the defamatory material printed in the defend-
ant's magazine had been circulated to readers within the forum
state. The defendant did no business in New Hampshire other than
circulate the magazines in question.
Keeton's finding that the state of New Hampshire could consti-
tutionally assert long-arm jurisdiction over the publisher recognizes
that plaintiffs have a wide choice in picking a forum. Further,
choice of law considerations do not eliminate, and may indeed in-
form, this choice. The Court was entirely unmoved by the defend-
ant's forum shopping claim, and concluded that Keeton's choice of
New Hampshire was "no different from the litigation strategy of
countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with favorable substantive or
procedural rules or sympathetic local populations." 26 This laissez-
faire treatment of the forum shopping problem is strikingly at odds
with recent Burger Court opinions which disapprove of a moving
party's efforts to obtain a federal forum. In that context, the fact
that a perceived advantage prompts the choice renders the chosen
forum suspect. The choice unfairly casts aspersions on the alterna-
tive forum's capabilities. Yet the conflict of laws decisions leave the
impression that the moving party who does not take sharp advan-
tage of differences in fora is something of a fool.
B. Recognition ofJudgments: State Interests in Enforcement or State
Interests in Relitigation?
We have seen that a federal court must in some cases defer
when a state court has seized or might take adjudicative jurisdic-
tion. "Comity," when invoked rhetorically, signifies that the mov-
ing party is about to be denied a choice between the state and
federal courts. The same pattern occurs in recognition of judg-
ments, although the legal issue is structured somewhat differently.
In the judgments area, the problem includes a moving party, his or
25 104 S. Ct. 1473 (1984). One of the authors was counsel of record for the defendants
in this case.
26 Id. at 1480.
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her chosen forum, and the protesting party who wishes to preserve
an earlier victory in the alternative forum's rendering court.
In this area, as in adjudicative jurisdiction, the federal standard
of deference to a state court proceeding is much more exacting
than the standard of deference which one state court must grant to
another. This is true even though the same statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738,27 specifies both standards of deference. Even where the
rendered judgment is not automatically entitled to substantive def-
erence, as in the law of habeas corpus, the process is granted a wide
berth under the principle of comity.
The leading case is Allen v. McCury.28 In Allen, the respondent
was convicted in state court after an unsuccessful motion to sup-
press evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment. The respondent then brought a section 1983 action in
federal court against the police officers who had seized the evi-
dence. The Court held that the issue, once litigated, had the same
preclusive effect in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1738 that it en-
joyed in the courts of the rendering state.29
Later cases extended the interpretation of section 1738. In
Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp.,30 the Court held that section
1738 required a federal district court to give preclusive effect to a
state appellate court's affirmance of an administrative finding that
petitioner's Title VII claim was meritless. The Court observed that
a failure to find preclusive effect would not only violate comity but
would also reduce states' incentive to work toward effective antidis-
crimination systems. 31 Similarly, in Migra v. Warren City School Dis-
trict,32 the Court held that the state court's decision against
plaintiff's contractual employment claim precluded a section 1983
claim in federal court. Even though Allen addressed only issue pre-
clusion, the Court found no distinction between the issue preclu-
sive and claim preclusive effects of state court judgments. Denying
preclusive effect in either case would equally reflect an unwarranted
distrust of state courts:
[Section 1738] embodies the view that it is more important to
give full faith and credit to state-court judgments than to ensure
separate forums for federal and state claims. This reflects a vari-
ety of concerns, including notions of comity, the need to pre-
vent vexatious litigation, and a desire to conserve judicial
27 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982) (requiring that full faith and credit be given to the "Acts,
records and judicial proceedings" of any "State, Territory, or Possession" of the United
States).
28 449 U.S. 90 (1980).
29 Id. at 105.
30 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
31 Id. at 478.
32 104 S. Ct. 892 (1984).
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resources. 33
Ordinarily, preclusion principles are justifiable in terms ofjudi-
cial economy as well as comity. In one context, however, that of
habeas corpus, avoidance of duplicative litigation is not an available
explanation. The habeas trend requiring exhaustion of state reme-
dies certainly rules out judicial economy as the motivating force. In
Rose v. Lundy,3 4 the prisoner's petition advanced two claims of relief
for which he had exhausted his state remedies and two for which he
had not. The Court announced a rule of total exhaustion, requiring
federal dismissal of any petition that contains both exhausted and
unexhausted claims.35 Such dismissal confronts the petitioner with
a choice of litigating unexhausted claims in state courts or proceed-
ing with only exhausted claims in federal court. This latter course
risks dismissal of subsequent federal claims. The Court thus rea-
soned that its rule would encourage state prisoners to seek full re-
lief from state courts in the first instance. This diversion of cases
from federal courts would give state courts first shot at all claims of
constitutional error, increase their familiarity with federal constitu-
tional issues, and provide a factual record of the exhausted claims
for federal review.
The exhaustion requirement itself is not attributable to the
Burger Court; it predated the Court by many years.36 But Rose v.
Lundy is an expansion not earlier anticipated. The Court has also
quite recently expanded the list of "factual" issues on which the
federal habeas court must defer to the state court's judgments. 37
Moreover, the Burger Court has brought the equivalent of claim
preclusion into the habeas corpus context. Claim preclusion in-
volves foreclosure of claims that were not litigated in previous
proceedings. The Court introduced foreclosure in habeas by sub-
stituting a "cause and prejudice" standard for the "deliberate by-
pass" standard of the Warren Court. Under the liberal Warren
Court decisions, a defendant would be foreclosed from presenting
a new claim only if he or she had deliberately bypassed state proce-
dures for asserting that claim in the earlier proceeding.38
Wainwright v. Sykes39 adopted the cause and prejudice standard
allowing claim preclusion, and the standard was exemplified and
extended in Engle v. Isaac.40 In Engle, the defendant failed to follow
33 Id. at 898.
34 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
35 Id. at 513-15.
36 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982) was originally enacted in 1966.
37 Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985).
38 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438-39 (1963).
39 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
40 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
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Ohio's requirement of contemporaneous objection to a jury in-
struction that incorrectly allocated the burden of proof on self de-
fense. Barred by procedural default from raising his constitutional
claim on direct appeal, the prisoner sought a writ of habeas corpus.
The Court denied the writ for failure to meet the "cause and preju-
dice" standard, observing that federal intrusions into state criminal
trials "frustrate both the States' sovereign power to punish offend-
ers and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional rights. ' '4 1
The prisoner's explanation for failure to raise the claim was that it
had not yet been recognized in Supreme Court precedent. The
Court argued, however, that there was adequate reason to antici-
pate the defense. "Where the basis of a constitutional claim is
available, and other defense counsel have perceived and litigated
that claim, the demands of comity and finality counsel against label-
ing alleged unawareness of the objection as a cause for a proce-
dural default." 42
The momentum toward increased federal recognition of state
judgments appears to be building. Though reasoned primarily in
terms of the legislative intent behind section 1738 and the policies
of finality and judicial economy behind res judicata, the judgments
decisions invoke the same unwillingness to question the ability of
state courts as do the decisions in the adjudicative jurisdiction area.
Given this mounting trend of deference to the rendering court,
it seems incredible that in the state/state context the rendering
state's interest in the integrity of its judgments would be denied.
Yet that is precisely what happened in Thomas v. Washington Gas
Light Co. 43 The petitioner, a District of Columbia resident who was
injured at his workplace in Virginia, received workers' compensa-
tion benefits from Virginia's Industrial Commission under that
state's Workmen's Compensation Act. He then received a supple-
mental award from the District of Columbia under the District's
own Act. A plurality of four, joined by three concurrences, held
that the full faith and credit clause did not preclude these succes-
sive workers' compensation awards.
The opinion explained that a state has no legitimate interest in
preventing another state from granting supplemental compensa-
tion when that other state would have had power to apply its entire
workers' compensation law in the first place.44 The determination
that only another such state may relitigate amounts to no deference
to judgments at all. It is simply the usual choice of law requirement
that a state must have an adequate basis for applying its law. The
41 Id. at 128.
42 Id. at 134.
43 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
44 Id. at 286.
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judgment, per se, is entitled to no force because relitigation is
barred only when litigation would be barred anyway for other
reasons.
45
This denigration of a state's concern for the integrity of its
judgments is simply astounding to any observer who has followed
recent judgments law in federal jurisdiction. In federal jurisdiction,
section 1738 was read literally to require the, same effect that the
rendering court would grant. This principle was dismissed cava-
lierly in Thomas on the ground that the rendering state might not
trench on the prerogatives of the enforcing state this way. 46 In-
stead, the guiding principle was the interest of the enforcing court
in providing protection for a litigant with whose interests it was
concerned. 47 Thomas makes the state's interest in relitigation para-
mount and its interest in integrity of judgments subordinate or
even faintly impertinent. This principle is strikingly similar to an
argument rejected without serious consideration in the fed-
eral/state arena: namely, that federal courts might relitigate out of
concern for a party asserting federal constitutional claims.
This divergence makes a state's interest in the integrity of its
judgments crucial when the second court is federal but nonexistent
when the second court is a state. Yet it is highly unlikely that a
state, while deeply wounded by federal court relitigation, is uncon-
cerned about another state doing exactly the same thing. Note that
the injured worker in Thomas had no better explanation than the
prisoner in Engle for his failure to raise a claim successfully in the
first instance. In Thomas, the injured worker had simply made a
poor choice about the best place to bring suit; he chose a forum
with a less advantageous law. The prisoner in Engle, of course, did
not choose a state forum at all; furthermore, he had even less ability
to be aware of the novel constitutional defense than the worker had
reason to know of a forum with more favorable workers' compensa-
tion law. One tends to be sympathetic to injured workers, who may
not know their legal rights,48 but is sympathy of this sort more ap-
propriate than it is for prisoners with habeas claims?
Thomas seems particularly anomalous in light of the most re-
cent Burger Court decision regulating federal enforcement of state
45 Where the second state has no power to apply its own law, it will not entertain a
workers' compensation case because adjudicative jurisdiction is statutorily unavailable any-
way. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 261-62 (1971). Thus, the
plurality opinion reduces to a requirement that in order to relitigate, the forum must be in a
position to litigate; this affords no protection to the judgment.
46 448 U.S. at 285.
47 Id.
48 See id. at 284-85 (injured worker often initiates compensation claim informally, while
still hospitalized, without aid of counsel, and without special attention to choice of most
appropriate forum).
1985]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
court decisions, Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons.49
Marrese involved a federal antitrust action over which federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction. Here, however, the federal court had to
determine the preclusive effect of a prior state court judgment re-
garding a related common law claim. If the Court followed the plu-
rality's approach in Thomas, there would automatically be no
preclusive effect in federal court over a claim as to which that court
had jurisdiction. Yet the Marrese Court remanded for a determina-
tion of whether state judgments law would preclude the claim-the
issue declared irrelevant in Thomas because it would allow the ren-
dering court to trench on the enforcing court's prerogatives. If
state judgments law would preclude the claim, the only basis for
nonrecognition would be a congressionally mandated exception to
section 1738.50 No such finding of congressional intent was either
made or required in Thomas.
This unwillingness in state/state judgment recognition to im-
pose limitations upon the chosen forum is reminiscent of the rea-
soning in the state/state adjudicatory jurisdiction situation, such as
Keeton. Those states whose statutes of limitations had already fore-
closed suit against Hustler Magazine (and to that extent, had con-
clusively disposed of Keeton's claim), had no constitutional interest
sufficient to prevent New Hampshire from asserting jurisdiction
over Keeton's claim. The claims of the alternative fora were disre-
garded. In both contexts, what happens, or does not happen, else-
where is deemed irrelevant to the propriety of what happens in the
proceeding in the moving litigant's chosen forum. This result is
contrary to the federal/state situation, where the state proceedings
are very relevant to and, as we have seen, often determine, which
actions the federal court may or may not take.
The full faith and credit statute is clearly premised on a consti-
tutional interest in interjurisdictional enforcement of judgments.
Both federal and state judgment enforcement law is based upon
this single statute. The Thomas decision, then, should be strictly
limited to its facts or repudiated outright. 51 The plurality opinion
in Thomas also seems inconsistent with the vision of full faith and
credit in the state/state context that the Court articulated in Under-
writers National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life. 52 Its ringing de-
49 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985).
50 105 S. Ct. at 1333.
51 See Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and Federal Law,
79 MIcH. L. REv. 1315, 1323 (1981) (criticizing plurality opinion). See also Sterk, Full Faith
and Credit, More or Less, to Judgments: Doubts About Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 69
GEo. L.J. 1329 (1981).
52 455 U.S. 691, 715 (1982) (full faith and credit clause prevents courts of North Caro-
lina and of Indiana from reaching mutually inconsistent judgments on same issue).
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fense of full faith and credit conspicuously makes no reference to
the independent state interests in relitigating the controversy that
figured prominently in Thomas. Furthermore, the Justices favoring
enforcement in Thomas have been consistent in their pro-enforce-
ment attitudes in federal courts. 53 The peculiarity of workers' com-
pensation law persuaded several others to concur in the result
without approving the plurality's reasoning.54 Still, until a majority
of the Court repudiates the plurality opinion 55 or limits the case to
its facts, there is an embarrassing inconsistency between the section
1738 effect of a state judgment in state courts and in federal courts.
C. Sovereign Immunity: Literalism or Liberal Reading?
Concerns for comity also arise in sovereign immunity cases. In
sovereign immunity, as in adjudicative jurisdiction, the question
arises as to whether a particular forum can entertain an action over
the other litigant's objection that the case should be brought in
some alternative forum. The distinctive feature in the sovereign
immunity context is that the protesting litigant, a governmental en-
tity, asserts that the action can only be brought if it all in its own
courts. Such claims have been markedly more successful in the fed-
eral/state context than the state/state context.
In the federal/state context, the guiding principle is the elev-
enth amendment.56 On numerous occasions, 57 the Court has said
that the eleventh amendment operates to constitutionalize the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity, which was wrongly repudiated in
Chisholm v. Georgia.58 Indeed, the sovereign immunity doctrine is
essential to the Court's interpretation of the amendment. By its
literal terms the amendment only prohibits suits brought by citizens
of one state against another.59 Such literalism has never been em-
ployed; liberal readings relying on broader sovereign immunity
53 See note 6 supra.
54 Under earlier Supreme Court precedents, the second state might relitigate if the first
state left open the option of successive relitigation in another state. In concurrence, several
Justices argued that this standard was met. 448 U.S. at 286 (White, J., concurring) (Burger,
CJ., Powell, J., joining).
55 The Court has passed up an opportunity to reconsider the holding of Thomas. See
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Warren, 163 Ga. App. 759, 295 S.E.2d 743 (1982), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 104 S. Ct. 476 (1983) (presenting same issue as Thomas).
56 U.S. CONsT. amend. XI: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
57 See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S. Ct. 900, 906-07 (1984)
(citing cases); Quern v.Jordan, 440 U.S. 313, 332, 341 (1979); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934); Exparte State of N.Y. No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
58 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
59 See note 56 supra.
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principles have guided the important precedents. Thus in Monaco
v. Mississippi,60 the Court denied jurisdiction over a case brought by
the principality of Monaco against the state of Mississippi, stating:
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of
the words of § 1 of Article III, or assume that the letter of the
Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits
against nonconsenting States. Behind the words of the constitu-
tional provisions are postulates which limit and control. 6'
The Court had earlier held the amendment to bar suit by a citizen
against his or her own state in Hans v. Louisiana.62
The Burger Court has contributed substantially to the expan-
sive reading of the eleventh amendment. It has emphasized that
consent by a state to suit in federal court must be unequivocally
expressed.63 A waiver in state court does not amount to a waiver in
federal court. 64 Although Congress may abrogate state court im-
munity, an unequivocal expression is still required.6 5 Even where
the suit is for violation of federal constitutional rights, a federal
court may not award retroactive monetary relief.66 Most recently,
in the Pennhurst litigation,67 the Court held that the eleventh
amendment bars pendent jurisdiction over state law claims against
state officials. That result springs directly from principles of feder-
alism: "[I]t is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sover-
eignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to
conform their conduct to state law." 68 This controversial result69
provoked a stinging dissent. 70
Meanwhile, the Court blazed a trail in the opposite direction in
the conflict of laws. Nevada v. Hall7t addressed an issue that, sur-
prisingly, had never reached the Court before-whether one state
was obligated to respect the sovereign immunity law of another. In
60 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
61 Id. at 322.
62 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
63 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985). Edelman v.Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
64 Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitation Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450
U.S. 147 (1981), reh'g denied, 451 U.S. 933 (1981).
65 See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342 (1979).
66 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-65 (1974).
67 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984).
68 Id. at 911.
69 See generally Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpre-
tation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the
Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984).
70 104 S. Ct. at 922 (Stevens,J., dissenting) ("This case has illuminated the character of
an institution. . . .Nothing in the Eleventh Amendment, the conception of state sover-
eignty it embodies, or the history of this institution, requires or justifies such a perverse
result.")
71 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
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answering that a state need not,7 2 Justice Stevens initially noted that
whether the forum recognizes another state's sovereign immunity is
a question of local law and a matter of comity.73 He acknowledged
that the Framers of the Constitution probably took it for granted
that such comity would be extended. 74 The Justice also conceded
that language used in the ratification debates and in several cases
emphasized that nonconsenting states were never subject to suit.75
Nevertheless, he limited such language to the federal/state con-
text.76 He then pointed out that the text of article III and the elev-
enth amendment were not literally pertinent.77 In no other
source-neither full faith and credit nor implicit structural arrange-
ments-did he find a mandate for constitutional enforcement of in-
terstate comity. 78
Dissenting in Hall, Justice Blackmun stated that he would have
found such a source in "a guarantee that is implied as an essential
component of federalism." 79 TheJustice cited other constitutional
rights not grounded in specific textual provisions, such as the right
to travel.80 In a separate dissent, Justice Rehnquist focused on the
"implicit ordering of relationships within the federal system."8 1 He
cited constitutional history reflecting the Framers' intent to make
sovereign immunity secure8 2 and Supreme Court precedent appar-
ently recognizing a state's immunity in other states.8 3 Moreover, he
contrasted the literalism of the majority opinion with the Court's
liberal readings in such cases as Hans v. Louisiana and Monaco v. Mis-
sssippi. 4 Finally, Justice Rehnquist speculated that adjudication in
the courts of a sister state would be more of a threat than adjudica-
tion in a neutral (federal) forum.8 5 Existing sovereign immunity
law is thus backwards, from a policy point of view.
There is no obvious reason to support a liberal construction of
federal limitations (in the name of comity and state sovereignty)
while literally construing state limitations. It is unclear why state
72 Justices Powell and White, who joined the majority in Hall, later joined the majority
opinion in Pennhurst. Compare Hall, 440 U.S. at 411, 427, 433, with Pennhurst, 104 S. Ct. at
903, 921-22. Justice Blackmun dissented in both cases.
73 440 U.S. at 416.
74 Id. at 419.
75 Id. at 419-20.
76 Id. at 420-21.
77 Id. at 421.
78 See id. at 421-27.
79 Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
80 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 433 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82 See id. at 434-36 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
83 See id. at 437-38 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 439-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 442 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 434-36 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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sovereignty is more infringed by federal court adjudication than ad-
judication in state courts. The dissent in Nevada v. Hall had a good
point: A state might well prefer a neutral federal forum over the
court of a sister state. In the area of sovereign immunity, then, as in
adjudicative jurisdiction and judgments, recent Supreme Court de-
cisions have given state sovereignty more bite in the federal/state
arena than in the state/state arena.
D. Choice of Law and Deference to State Substantive Rules
The contours of the choice of law for federal/state relations
have been in place for several decades; indeed, some of the basic
premises go back much further. In 1821, the Court held in Cohens
v. Virginia86 that it may reverse incorrect state interpretations of fed-
eral law and thus choose an authoritative federal version over the
state one. The converse proposition-that federal courts must
choose the authoritative state court version of state law-awaited
the arrival of Erie.87
The more sophisticated choice of law problems that persist af-
ter Erie in the federal/state context also antedate the Burger Court.
These move beyond the simple question of whether to apply state
court precedents on state law issues or to adhere to Supreme Court
views on federal issues. The modem choice of law problems ex-
amine the extent to which a court may employ its own local rules to
implement a substantive right concededly stemming from another
source. This is the famous "substance/procedure" distinction. We
will not recall its tortured history here.88 For present purposes, we
only note the tightfistedness with which the distinction is applied in
the federal/state arena, and the leniency in the state/state context.
Some legal rules are characterized as substantive for one pur-
pose but procedural for the other. Statutes of limitations may be
the most obvious example. 89 Burden of proof, likewise, is charac-
terized as substantive for Erie purposes and procedural for conflicts
86 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 413-23 (1821).
87 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
88 See Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of
Laws, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 813 (1962); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 722-55 (2d ed.
1973); cf. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 45, at 45-52.
89 While refusing to label statutes of limitation explicitly as substantive or procedural in
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the Supreme Court required a federal
court sitting in diversity to apply the statute of limitations of the state in which it sat. Given
the Erie substantive-procedural dichotomy, this ruling implicitly labeled statutes of limita-
tions as substantive. But in Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953), the
Supreme Court held that a state could apply its own statute of limitations to a foreign
substantive right. For conflict of law purposes this holding implicitly labeled the statute of
limitations as procedural.
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purposes. 90 The result can be a federal court deferring to the court
of the state in which it sits (because burden of proof is substantive)
but not then deferring to the state which created the cause of action
(because burden of proof is procedural and forum law governs). 91
The rationale for a restrictive view of procedure in the federal/state
context is a deep aversion to forum shopping, according to Hanna
v. Plumer.92 The aversion obviously does not extend to horizontal
forum shopping between states. Again, this disparate treatment is
not a product of the Burger Court. Its features have been basically
in place for years.
While the Burger Court is not responsible for those doctrines,
it did recently preside over what is surely the most expansive choice
of law decision in Supreme Court history, Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague.93 In Allstate, a state was allowed to apply local law to a case
based on only three connecting factors: post-transaction change of
domicile by the plaintiff, completely unrelated business by the de-
fendant, and employment in the forum by the plaintiffs deceased
husband.94 None of these factors had any relevance to the substan-
tive dispute. All of the relevant events occurred in a different state,
in which all of the parties resided at the time of the relevant transac-
tions and injuries. Clearly, the Court's emerging standard for
choice of law is "few-holds-barred." Comity, the Court seems to
think, rarely requires one state to relinquish local policy objectives
to another state's goals. 95
The Court has recently reaffirmed Allstate's holding that the
due process clause and the full faith and credit clause of the Consti-
tution provide only modest restrictions on the forum's application
of its own law. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shults,96 the Court held
that a Kansas state court with jurisdiction over a nationwide class
action could not constitutionally apply Kansas law to all of the
transactions in question. Yet the Court elaborated no detailed limi-
tations on the state court's choice of the proper law for the various
90 See Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir.) (under Erie, federal court bound to
apply the law of burden of proof of Massachusetts, the state in which it sat), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 650 (1940); Levy v. Steiger, 233 Mass. 600, 124 N.E. 477 (1919) (under Massachusetts
law, burden of proof is procedural so that local standards applied); cf. Central Vt. Ry. v.
White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
91 Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 762 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
92 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
93 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
94 Id. at 313-20 (plurality opinion).
95 The Court has stated that the full faith and credit clause does not require automatic
subordination of a local policy. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422-23 (1979). See generally
Brilmayer, Credit Due Judgments and Credit Due Laws, 70 IOWA L. REV. 95 (1984). But see Mc-
Cluney v. Schlitz, 649 F.2d 578, 580-81 (8th Cir.), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 1071 (1981) (Mis-
souri letter statute inapplicable to employee transferred out-of-state).
96 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985).
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transactions, observing that "in many situations a state court may
be free to apply one of several choices of law." 97
While Phillips Petroleum thus leaves intact Allstate's very minimal
restrictions on choice of law in the state/state context, the Court
continues to require that federal courts defer in choice of law mat-
ters to the courts of the states in which they sit. However lacking in
deference a state court may choose to be, as a choice of law matter,
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.98 requires the federal
court sitting in that state to follow closely behind. Comity to the
local state courts is considered so crucial as to require the federal
court to turn a deaf ear to other states' claims for deference. This
schizophrenic attitude towards choice of law is identical to the
schizophrenic approach towards adjudicative jurisdiction. Federal
courts are obliged to defer blindly to the interests of the local state,
which is simultaneously ignoring the needs of other states with the
approval of the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, the Court has engaged off and on in an endeavor
to limit federal legislative jurisdiction in order to protect state sub-
stantive interests. The limitations on federal legislative jurisdiction
stemmed from unanticipated applications of the tenth amendment.
National League of Cities v. Usery,99 which has recently been overruled,
demonstrated that concerns for state sovereignty placed limits on
the applicability of otherwise valid laws. The Court held that the
Fair Labor Standards Act, insofar as it directly displaced the states'
freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional gov-
ernmental functions, was not within the authority given to Con-
gress by the commerce clause. 10 0
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sov-
ereignty attaching to every state government which may not be
impaired by Congress, not because Congress may lack an affirm-
ative grant of legislative authority to reach the matter, but be-
cause the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the authority
in that matter.10'
While not a choice of law case in the traditional sense, National
League of Cities certainly speaks to questions of legislative jurisdic-
tion. The law itself was not wholly unconstitutional or lacking an
affirmative regulatory basis; there was simply an enclave of state
power' 0 2 into which Congress might not reach.
97 Id. at 2981.
98 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
99 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
100 Id. at 852.
101 Id. at 845.
102 Cf. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974) (use of the "enclave
terminology").
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In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,10 3 the
Court held that the Fair Labor Standards Act's application to the
operations of a public transit authority did not contravene any af-
firmative limit to Congress' power under the commerce clause.
The Court determined that the Constitution's structuring of the
federal government, rather than any "freestanding conceptions of
state sovereignty,"1 0 4 insulated states from the excessive reach of
Congress' power under the commerce clause. The federal system's
procedural safeguards, rather than "judicially created limitations
on federal power," protect state sovereign interests.1 05 Garcia, by
recognizing that the political process protects the interests of state
sovereignty, may narrow the divergence between doctrinal develop-
ments in the federal/state area and in the state/state area to some
degree.
Yet Garcia does not resolve the tension. First, several members
of the Court are simply awaiting an opportunity to overrule it.106
Second, the opinion makes no effort to unify the treatment of fed-
eral/state and state/state comity. All in all, the opinion simply rein-
forces the feeling that comity is just a political football. There is no
consistent intellectual approach to the topic precisely because the
issue is subject to shifting political coalitions. One can hardly be
blamed for wondering whether some other, more principled, analy-
sis may be possible.
II. Analysis
Comparing conflict of laws doctrine to federal jurisdiction
challenges assumptions about state sovereignty that ordinarily go
unexamined. First, the analogy shows that comity and sovereignty
do not automatically require deference to the alternative forum.
Standards may be set which take another forum's interests into ac-
count without simply relinquishing one's own. Second, asserting
jurisdiction despite the legitimate concerns of other fora is not nec-
essarily an unwarranted intrusion, but may be the consequence of a
balancing of competing legitimate claims. Third, if co-equal sover-
eigns can assert jurisdiction despite the obligation of deference to
one another, why should the same not be possible between the fed-
eral government and the states? These observations raise two
questions. Is the Supreme Court as serious about state sovereignty
in the conflicts context as it sometimes claims to be? And, is its
103 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
104 Id. at 1017.
105 Id. at 1018.
106 Id. at 1021 (Powell, J., dissenting); Id. at 1033 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Id.
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Garcia was a 5-to-4 decision.
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concern for state sovereignty in the federal/state context sincere,
or a disguise for purely political maneuvering?
A. Variety and Uniformity
The search for the causes of the phenomenon of differential
state sovereignty begins with a simple observation about the polit-
ical structuring of the states and the federal government. The
states are all jurisdictionally equivalent to one another, while the
federal government is jurisdictionally complementary to the states.
When the federal government was created, certain powers previ-
ously subject only to state. authority were vested in the federal gov-
ernment. The federal government was thus composed of a subset
of the powers previously possessed by the states. The federal gov-
ernment and the states have different functions from one another.
In contrast, since the states had originally possessed complete
residual power, and since all states gave up the same powers to the
federal government, they still possessed identical powers after the
adoption of the Constitution. 10 7
While all the states possessed the same authority, it was to be
expected that they would exercise those powers differently. Pre-
cisely because they all were to address the same issues, their views
might directly conflict. The states are allowed-indeed, expected-
to disagree on substantive issues. This simple fact of life has been
elevated to something of a virtue. Our metaphor for the states is
"the fifty laboratories," which through the process of experimenta-
tion and competition evolve ever better substantive rules of law. 108
Federalism supposedly enhances, rather than impedes, their ability
to disagree with each other.
The federal government and the states are supposed to oper-
ate in tandem, not in competition. They do not address identical
sets of issues; their jurisdiction is differentiated along substantive
lines. Furthermore, in those situations where both the state and
federal governments might address the same issue, hierarchical
rules specify which law governs in case of conflict. If there is an
adequate constitutional basis for the federal rule, it preempts state
law. Absent a basis for federal regulation, state law prevails under
the Erie doctrine. While the metaphor for state/state conflicts is
107 In addition, there are some constitutional requirements that Congress act uniformly
with regard to all states. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 4 (uniform taxes, laws of
naturalization and bankruptcy); Id. § 9, cl. 6 (commerce regulations and revenues may not
prefer one state over another).
108 This idea that the states serve as 50 laboratories for the development of "new social,
economic, and political ideas" has been frequently recognized by the Supreme Court and
commentators. See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788
n.20 (1982).
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"fifty laboratories," the slogan for federal/state conflicts might be
"one right answer."
This may be an overly simplistic view, but it motivates much
jurisdictional law. Note the jurisdictional consequences of this sim-
ple view. As between the states, it makes a great deal of difference
to which state's authority a litigant falls prey. State substantive
rules are expected to be different; therefore it matters which law is
chosen. And state courts are widely separated geographically;
again, it is clear what is at stake in a choice of forum. When one
considers also that state choice of law rules may point towards dif-
ferent substantive laws, the forum choice directly implicates the
substantive law choice as well.
Conversely, if one were to assume that all fora were identical,
then they would all be interchangeable. The simplistic view of fed-
eral/state relations would lead one to conclude that relatively little
was at stake in rules of adjudicative jurisdiction. First, state and
federal courts are not widely separated geographically; as a practi-
cal matter, it would seem that litigants should not have a strong
preference. Second, both sets of courts are obliged to apply the
same substantive law; federal law if a valid federal rule exists, and
state law otherwise. Again, the choice of forum apparently would
not matter.
In one sense, this is the Burger Court's general outlook. Nu-
merous cases have explained the decision to decline jurisdiction on
the ground that state courts are as adept as federal courts in apply-
ing federal law. 10 9 But something is askew. If federal courts are
truly functionally equivalent to state courts, then there is nothing at
stake in revising jurisdictional rules to reflect the need for comity.
The litigant who would have preferred state court has nothing seri-
ous to complain about, since the court systems are interchangeable.
And the alternative state forum should not be concerned about
competition, because there would be no systematic bias in litigant
choice between the two sets of courts. Allocation of dispute resolu-
tion would be random and not reflect on their abilities or undercut
their judicial business in any serious way.
Why, then, is state sovereignty taken seriously in the federal
jurisdiction context and disregarded in the conflict of laws context?
We know that state laws differ substantively from one another. If
federal and state courts are fairly comparable, deference to the al-
temative forum should be a less important goal than in conflicts,
rather than a more important goal. If the Burger Court indeed be-
lieves that uniformity makes the choice ofjurisdiction less crucial, a
109 See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
493 n.35 (1976).
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reasonable assumption, then it should put its energies into increas-
ing respect for state sovereignty in the conflict of laws, and not in
the law of federal jurisdiction.
B. The Relative Sophistication of Conflict of Law Rules
The first response to this apparent paradox is that such atten-
tion is less necessary precisely because it has always been well rec-
ognized that differences between the states exist. In short, the
conflicts rules inherited by the Burger Court already accommodate
the legitimate interests of the protesting litigant and the alternative
forum to some degree.
For example, the due process minimum contacts test for per-
sonal jurisdiction explicitly addresses the problem of unfairness to
the litigant protesting jurisdiction. 010 A defendant forced to defend
in a location far removed from his or her home base faces serious
hardship. Furthermore, in the course of protecting a litigant from
having to defend far from home when he or she has no connections
with the forum that the plaintiff has selected, the Court simultane-
ously protects the sovereign interests of the defendant's major base
of operations."' If there are too few contacts to try the case locally
without creating unfairness to the defendant, then there is probably
some other state which has more contacts with the controversy and
a stronger interest in adjudication. Although the Burger Court may
have broken new ground in enunciating this explicit state sover-
eignty criterion, state sovereignty was already protected in the min-
imum contacts doctrine it inherited.
The same reasoning applies in the other doctrinal areas we de-
scribe. In the sovereign immunity context, Nevada v. Hall implicitly
did offer some protection to states. In Hall, a Nevada state car had
been involved in an automobile accident in California. California
courts clearly would have had personal jurisdiction had the defend-
ant been an individual, but the suit was brought against the state of
Nevada. The California Supreme Court, determining that Nevada's
claim to sovereign status became less compelling when it chose to
send its instrumentalities outside of the state, held that "state sov-
ereignty ends at the state boundary." 1 2 By exceeding its geo-
graphical limits, Nevada's position became analogous to that of a
110 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
111 See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980) (con-
cept of minimum contacts "protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a
distant or inconvenient forum" and ensures that "states, through their courts, do not reach
out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
system.").
112 See Hall v. University of Nevada, 8 Cal. 3d 522, 525, 105 Cal. Rptr. 355, 357, 503
P.2d 1363, 1365 (1972) (en banc).
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state officer who transgresses the substantive bounds of traditional
state prerogatives by violating the federal Constitution, thus forfeit-
ing immunity.1 1 3 Once put in context, Hall may recognize limits on
incursions into sister state sovereignty that are comparable to the
limits due process places in the context of adjudicative jurisdiction.
S6 also with choice of law problems. Due process has always
required that a forum have adequate connections with a case so that
application of local law is fair to the protesting party. In affording
this protection to a party, a court simultaneously recognizes the in-
terests of other states in which the dispute was primarily centered.
The Court might have interpreted state sovereignty restrictively in
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, and paid too little attention to the due
process rights of the defendant. 14 But it started from a group of
precedents which already took these considerations into account;
the cumulative effect of choice of law due process jurisprudence
still recognizes that the differences in state law require protection
of such interests.
The judicially developed law of federal jurisdiction that the
Burger Court inherited, however, did not make explicit accommo-
dation to the interests of a state in entertaining litigation, or to the
interests of one of the litigants in bringing the action in state
court."15 Jurisdictional statutes either assume that the federal and
state courts are comparable, or provide for access to federal court
where some reason exists to believe that the federal court might be
superior. For example, diversity jurisdiction is premised on a con-
cern that state courts may discriminate against out-of-state resi-
dents. But neither the view that state and federal courts are
interchangeable nor the recognition that federal courts might be
preferable in limited classes of cases can give rise to a vested inter-
est in access to state court. If the two court systems provide the
same product, nothing turns on the choice between them. On the
other hand, if the state court would provide its own citizen with an
unfair advantage, the litigant cannot claim such an unfair advantage
as a right. No state court has a right to retain jurisdiction so that it
may discriminate.
Thus, the federal jurisdiction rules the Burger Court inherited
113 Cf. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (state officer acting in violation of the Consti-
tution no longer qualifies as "state" for purposes of eleventh amendment).
114 See generally Brilmayer, supra note 51 (criticizing Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague). The
decision was roundly criticized in the conflicts literature. SeeJ. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS
CASES AND MATERIALS 338 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing scholarly reaction to the decision).
115 Of course, the Warren Court recognized the interests of one of the litigants in access
to a federal forum. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967) ("In thus expanding
federal judicial power, Congress imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to
give due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his
federal constitutional claims.").
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were based on the assumption that no particular deference to the
state as an alternative forum was necessary. Neither of these prem-
ises generates doctrinal explanations of why a state court might
have a right to keep cases, or why a party might legitimately prefer
to be in state court. In order to generate such doctrine, the Court
had to alter a set of underlying premises that failed to grant explicit
recognition to the alternative forum's needs-hence its numerous
decisions explaining the importance of state sovereignty in federal
jurisdiction. It simply had much further to go than it did in conflict
of laws, and its greater discussion of state sovereignty in the federal
jurisdiction context merely brings that bundle of doctrines into
line.
Our descriptive thesis is that the Burger Court has simply re-
stricted a power which the federal courts have always taken for
granted but which the states have never had; namely, the opportu-
nity to be totally unconcerned with the interests of the alternative
forum it was preempting. If true, this explanation serves to present
the fundamental issue. Is such a strategy legitimate? Is it even
rational?
One important legitimacy question concerns the separation of
powers implications of such a strategy. In short, if Congress has
vested the federal courts with jurisdiction, are courts empowered to
decide that the statutory grants did not take state sovereignty suffi-
ciently into account? This crucial issue has recently been ad-
dressed, 116 and we decline to address it further here. Instead, we
question whether such a strategy is rational, honest, and consistent
with other premises the Court has claimed to hold.
The Court has often said that the federal courts and the state
courts are comparable in expertise, sensitivity to federal rights, and
so forth. If convincingly stated, this may serve to refute the premise
that federal courts are superior. But all it can create is parity; that
is, it merely shows that nothing turns on which court entertains an
action. By itself, it can never explain why the needs of the alterna-
tive state forum ought to be taken into account, or why one liti-
gant's preference for state court should be dispositive. If the fora
are truly interchangeable, litigant preference will be random and
neither court will undercut the other.
Indeed, the Burger Court makes its own task more difficult. If
the goal is to explain why state courts are preferable, it should be
focusing on the differences between state and federal courts. By
insisting on complete parity, it undercuts its other efforts to change
the allocation ofjurisdiction. One can only conclude that its efforts
116 See Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE
LJ. 71 (1984).
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to restrict the reach of statutory jurisdictional rules are based on a
definite but never openly acknowledged belief that the two sets of
court systems are different in significant ways.
C. The Myth of Parity
How different are the state and federal courts? Are the differ-
ences inevitable and eradicable, or temporary? Some of the litera-
ture asserting differences between the state and federal courts has a
particular political slant. Such arguments take the position that fed-
eral courts are superior in certain respects and that in certain in-
stances a litigant should have a right to litigate in federal court. But
the question of whether differences exist can be approached with-
out any advance conclusions about whether or how those differ-
ences ought to be resolved. Balanced examination shows that some
of these arguments look better than others.
Consider first the following straightforward argument that dif-
ferences may exist. The federal courts were first authorized be-
cause the Framers of the Constitution realized that the state courts
were deficient in certain respects. State courts might be biased
against out-of-staters, or against federal claims. If the state courts
were perfect, there would be no need for federal courts. Thus,
when the Framers and Congress established the lower federal
courts, they would have assumed that these courts were superior in
these respects. Also, when Congress extended jurisdiction over
certain federal causes of action such as the civil rights claims, the
reason was that state courts were inadequate. Hence, federal courts
are superior with regard to such problems.
This superficial explanation is inadequate. Initially, it seems
plausible that the federal courts must be superior, because if they
were only as good as the state courts they would be superfluous and
would not have been created. But this takes a static view of an es-
sentially dynamic situation. Perhaps it was true that, at the time the
civil rights acts were adopted, the state courts were biased or in-
competent. But the competitive pressure of an alternative forum
might, in the long run, compel the state courts to achieve the same
level of competence as their competitors. They would have to fol-
low federal court results closely, at the risk of losing their business.
Any systematic difference would inhere to the disadvantage of one
of the litigants, who would then either file in federal court initially
or remove.
Thus, the simple fact of two sets of courts does not necessarily
mean differentiation. More successful proof of differences relies
upon observation of actual differences in functioning. Such differ-
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ences are strongly asserted in the literature.1 17 First, article III
judges have life tenure and may thus be less susceptible to
majoritarian political pressures. 118 Their bureaucratic orientation
points them toward greater fidelity to federal law. 119 Their clerks
and staff may be superior.1 20 Especially in habeas corpus cases,
they focus exclusively on enforcing federal constitutional rights,
without the prejudices and distractions of conducting trials of crim-
inal cases. 121
To continue the argument, authors have noted that correcting
such systemic problems requires original jurisdiction in the federal
trial courts; Supreme Court review is not enough. As an appellate
court, it has very limited fact finding capabilities. If the harsh treat-
ment of citizens of other states or federal claims is accomplished
through findings of fact, then appellate review is not an adequate
safeguard. In addition, the Supreme Court's docket precludes re-
view of every case. 122
The weakness in these arguments, if one exists, is the lack of
proof that state judges are biased. Perhaps state judges are aware
of these influ¢r.ces and conscientiously counteract them. Proving
bias may be too subjective to be empirically verifiable. But the
Court itself ought not reject too quickly the idea that federal judges
are more authoritative interpreters of federal law. After all, it has
recognized that state judges are more authoritative interpreters of
state law; that is the premise underlying the abstention doctrines. 23
Furthermore, that premise has not been thought to insult federal
court judges, who are bound to carry out state law to the best of
their abilities.
More objective observations exhibit the differences between
the courts. The federal courts offer different rights and remedies.
A defendant in a state criminal trial who presents a constitutional
claim may be unable to get class-based relief, prospective relief, or
interlocutory review.' 24 No amount of subjective sensitivity on the
part of state court judges will surmount such structural differences
in the nature of the relief ordered.
117 See Laycock, supra note 8, at 202-22; Neuborne, supra note 8, at 1118-28.
118 See Neuborne, supra note 8, at 1127-28.
119 See id. at 1124-25.
120 See id. at 1121-22.
121 See id. at 1125-26 (federal judges insulated from distasteful fact patterns so that they
can solely test abstract constitutional doctrine); Note, Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners:
The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 78, 81, 135 (1964) (federal habeas courts isolate
federal rights, considering constitutional claims free from effect of prejudicial state rules).
122 In addition, federal issues arising in the state courts may be mooted on appeal by the
existence of an adequate state ground.
123 See generally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 302-30 (4th ed. 1983) (discussing
abstention doctrines).
124 Laycock, supra note 8, at 194.
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Nevertheless, comparable arguments may favor a state forum.
State courts can offer remedies that federal courts cannot. These
remedies inhere to the benefit of the state. A federal court enter-
taining a civil rights claim arising out of a criminal prosecution, for
example, will not impose a criminal conviction even if the constitu-
tional claim is denied. Thus a federal court has much to offer crimi-
nal defendants, at least in terms of delay if not a victory on the
merits, while imposing few risks. The state, on the other hand,
stands to gain nothing by duplicative litigation in the federal courts.
This argument applies with even greater force to federal habeas ju-
risdiction, which offers the prisoner a potential remedy of a new
trial or release from prison, while placing the state as prosecutor in
a no-win situation.
The unilateral advantages to the defendant of a federal forum
and the unilateral advantages to the prosecution of a state forum
owe much to the structure of public law litigation. State courts are
well situated to handle cases on behalf of the state by offering the
state the remedy which it seeks but offering few remedies advanta-
geous to the defendant. Federal courts, conversely, are well situ-
ated to handle cases on behalf of the individual litigant, offering the
remedy he or she seeks but not providing the remedy sought by the
state. Typically, one sovereign's courts do not enforce the criminal
law ofanother's. 125 Thus, each party prefers to be a moving party,
choosing and litigating in the forum which offers only the remedies
advantageous to his or her side.
These differences may figure as heavily in the battle over allo-
cation of a federal forum as any perceived differences in abstract
sympathies to federal constitutional rights. Even where there are
no differences in sympathies to unpopular claims, the state will
clearly prefer a state forum. Indeed, it is plausible to wonder
whether the deference which the Burger Court accords to "state
interests" is not deference to the state qua party, rather than to the
state qua alternative forum. Many cases in which state sovereignty
plays an important role are the cases in which the state is a party to
the litigation. If state sovereignty protected the interests of the
state qua forum, then the Burger Court should be as concerned
with private civil cases as with public law cases. Since it has made
no effort to redefine jurisdiction in private civil cases, it seems rea-
sonable to suspect that its solicitude is triggered by the state's party
status.
Whether the Court is favoring the state as a party or as an al-
ternative forum, the reasons that the state prefers state court are
125 Leflar, Conflict of Laws: Choice of Law in Criminal Cases, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 44, 46
(1974).
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identical to the reasons that the individual prefers the federal fo-
rum. Even if one assumes the utmost good faith and expertise in
the state courts, the states are inevitably bound to prefer litigating
in state court, where there is something to be gained through litiga-
tion. And the individual rights-holder is bound to prefer litigating
in federal courts, where a wider range of remedies is available, and
the state will have no remedies in return. Identifying differences
merely states the problem; it does not show how to solve it. And it
highlights the difficulties of insisting that there are no differences,
while surreptitiously resolving all of the differences in favor of one
party to the litigation.
III. Conclusion
If the Supreme Court were to free itself from its misconceived
insistence that federal and state courts are virtually interchangea-
ble, then it would be in a better position to explain why it considers
the state courts to be superior.1 26 Not all differences are perni-
cious, or insulting to the states. By not identifying these differ-
ences, though, it is impossible to explain why a state has a
legitimate interest in litigating in state court, or why federal court
litigation is more intrusive than state court application of the same
constitutional standard. Once the differences are recognized, a sys-
tem for apportioning jurisdiction fairly and openly should naturally
develop.
That is the solution in the conflict of laws, and it is a solution
which should provide guidance by analogy. Comity is not a tacked-
on afterthought, and less of a political football. Such apportion-
ment cannot be undertaken if it is consistently denied that there are
any relevant differences between the two competing courts. Juris-
dictional history is littered with examples of the difficulties in arriv-
ing at a fair apportionment when the prevalent norms require that
institutions in power deny the existence of any differences.1 27
126 The Court in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982), suggested one possible rationale
for preferring state to federal courts for adjudication of habeas claims: Given first opportu-
nity to review all claims of constitutional error, the state courts "may become increasingly
familiar with and hospitable toward federal constitutional issues." Id. at 518-19. A concur-
ring opinion noted that this conception of comity appeared "more destructive than solici-
tous of federal-state comity;" requiring the habeas petitioner to exhaust a frivolous claim in
state court "hardly demonstrates respect for the state courts" and would deplete the state
judiciary's time and resources. Id. at 525 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
127 For example, prior to Erie Railroad there was no principled method for choosing
whether the litigants got the state or federal version of "common law." This led to the
observation in that opinion that some litigants were denied equal protection because the
assignment of legal rule was essentially arbitrary, depending solely on whether diversity
existed. Yet such an allocative system could not be provided without institutionalizing the
differences of opinion.
Similarly, retroactivity analysis can proceed only with recognition that the new rule is
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If the Court is unwilling to institutionalize differences that are
simply too difficult for the jurisdictional structure to admit, then
jurisdictional doctrines accommodating those differences cannot be
developed. But if the Court declines specifically to recognize these
differences, its current doctrines of "state sovereignty" will exhibit
inconsistency. These doctrines can only be harmonized by recog-
nizing that differences in the court systems exist, and that some-
thing is at stake in the choice between them. Openly addressing
precisely what is at stake would go a long way towards reconciling
the two different faces of federalism.
different from the old. Retroactivity analysis allocates jurisdiction between two courts at
different points in time. Once it is conceded that a ruling really amounts to a "change" in
law, then it makes sense to ask whether earlier decisions need to be reopened.
A third example involves conflict between the circuits. When a case is transferred to
another state for trial, it takes the transferor court's law with it. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612 (1964). However, it does not take the transferor circuit's version of federal law
with it. See Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93
YALE LJ. 677, 686, 702 (1984) (requirement that each court of appeals interpret federal law
independently prevents formation of rule requiring transferee court to follow another cir-
cuit's interpretation of federal law). To respect transferor law that way would institutional-
ize splits in the circuit; to fail to do so incorporates forum shopping for choice of law
purposes into the transfer process.
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